What's next for Wagner in Syria, Africa after Putin mutiny?

Yevgeny Prigozhin's mutiny, which in Vladimir Putin's eyes has been reclassified him from patriot to traitor following the mutiny events of the last week, is a kind of stress test not only for Russia's domestic political reality, but also for the Kremlin's foreign policy activity.

All Russian experts agree that changes within the political system of Russia are now inevitable, especially on the defense side as CNN reports that Sergey Surovikin, a prominent Russian general, commander of the Aerospace Forces, has been detained. The chief of Russia’s general staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, whom Prigozhin asked for his removal, has not been seen since the Wagner rebellion. 

The only question of the changes is the timing, because President Vladimir Putin does not like to take decisions under pressure, or acknowledge the cracks that unfolded in the the aftermath of Wagner's mutiny. 

According to media reports, the process of redistributing Prigozhin's assets in Russia has already been launched, which points to the Kremlin's intention to eventually deprive Prigozhin of all his internal political tools. But everything is much more complicated with foreign projects.

For a long time, many of Moscow's operations in the grey zone have been carried out either directly through Prigozhin and his people, or with his resources to support the operations of the special services.

Prigozhin foreign projects 'reorganized'

The list of Prigozhin's foreign projects is impressive, including "troll factory" information campaigns against American electoral processes. It also includes the mercenary military operations to storm Palmyra and Eastern Ghouta in Syria and the attempted rapid advance of convoys under air defense cover to Tripoli in 2020, which was essentially a rehearsal of the recent "march on Moscow."

However, Prigozhin was not the sole boss of the paramilitary structure. At one time, it was Russian authorities who instructed Prigozhin to become the curator of an officially non-existent mercenary company in order to minimize costs in the event of failed operations. Prigozhin, having armed units at hand, began to gradually combine his personal business projects abroad and those carried out exclusively for the state, but in principle they rarely ever came into conflict.

In Libya, the unambiguous activation of the Wagner PMCs in 2018 occurred precisely when the Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry began to support Khalifa Hifter. Prigozhin's people coordinated with the Rusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and even wrote reports for the military department. When hopes of Hifter taking Tripoli failed to materialize, the level of Wagner's presence was reduced, and the Foreign Ministry again began actively engaging with Hifter's opponents and balancing the various players.

Also, the Russian Khmeimim air base in Latakia has always been a hub for the logistical support of Prigozhin's units in various countries, primarily in Africa. While the mercenaries often flew around the world as regular passengers, all the weapons and equipment, including air defense equipment, were delivered by transport flights of the MoD.

Thus, it is extremely difficult for Yevgeny Prigozhin, displaced as a result of the agreements between Moscow and Minsk, to become the new Bob Denard, the French miliary legend who for decades was involved in coups and mercenary activities in Africa. According to Novaya Gazeta, "even just protecting assets from hostile takeovers in the local market without official status, support from the Russian Foreign Ministry, and the whole authority of Russia is extremely difficult."

Al-Monitor's sources confirm Wall Street Journal reports that Moscow told authorities in Syria, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and several other countries on the day of the uprising that the Kremlin was taking control of the Wagner PMCs and no escalation would take place on their territory. 

Al-Monitor’s source close to the Russian diplomatic corps in Syria says, "So far, no one has much idea how to reorganize the the Wagner Group’s work here without consequences and accidents, so it is possible that they will not find anything better than to just deny that there are Wagner’s units here, as Damascus is already doing, but slowly they will conduct an audit and look for a solution." 

At the same time, one of Prigozhin's people, who is now in Syria, wrote, "Entire sectors of Russian foreign policy are dependent on the assets of Wagner PMC abroad, and if they are removed, there will be a rapid compression of Russian influence, more in Africa, to a lesser extent in Syria.’"

Wagner stronger in Africa

In African countries, Prigozhin's structures, performing delicate missions, often lobbied for the deployment of official military facilities in the interests of the Russian MoD. Wagner, with its flexible structure and speed of decision-making, acted as a locomotive, which paved the way for the official Russian agencies.

In this sense, in Syria, where Moscow has a stable official presence, it is hypothetically easiest to replace over time the extensive military and administrative structure of the Wagner PMC and solve the problem of mercenary salaries, which are several times higher than the salary of a Russian contract servicemen.

In addition to the cadre of military personnel in Syria, there is Redut PMC, created by the MoD, staffed and funded by Airborne reservists. Also, the projects of Gennady Timchenko, a businessman close to the Kremlin, continue to operate in Syria, which may well absorb Prigozhin's economic projects in Homs and several other provinces. 

"In the short term, to replace Prigozhin's projects in Africa, especially in the Sahel zone, is clearly impossible,"  says one Russian expert, who often travels to Africa and with whom Al-Monitor spoke on condition of anonymity. "Official military trainers will not engage in what was involved in the PMC Wagner, that is, directly in the suppression of insurgency."

In late July, St. Petersburg will host the second Russia-Africa Summit, and any changes may affect the Russian image. ‘If there is a real task to replace Prigozhin in Africa, then gradually Moscow can do it, especially since a number of African regimes would like to interact more with official Russian companies in the economic and cultural spheres, rather than with the Wagner PMC," Al-Monitor’s source noted.

According to another source close to a Wagner recruiting center in central Russia, some members of the Wagner PMCs are actively signing contracts to go to Africa, because "there is a possibility that Belarus will be a kind of transit point." Earlier, some Russian-language Telegram channels, citing a source in Minsk, reported that the Belarusian base for Wagner would only be a transit base for rest and training.

Thus, Belarusian military analyst Alexander Alesin suggests that Prigozhin will not stay in Belarus long and will be sent to Africa. "Belarus has several air bases of transport aviation there, and the routes of transport planes of Belarusian airlines and military aviation are very well established," he said.

Alesin points out that Lukashenko has been extensively spreading networks in Africa in recent years for agricultural and industrial projects.

But even if we assume that Prigozhin and his loyal Wagner units, redeployed to Belarus, will operate in Africa in the interests of Alexander Lukashenko, these activities do not necessarily align with Moscow's interests.

The feeling is that neither Moscow, nor Minsk, nor Prigozhin himself, have figured out how to divide foreign projects and prevent competition between the reorganized PMC Wagner and Prigozhin's own companies. Moscow may have to put up with the activities of the former loyalist and the current rebel for quite a long time, while Prigozhin will eventually have to choose — either to finally go into opposition, or look for a suitable excuse to return the favor of the Kremlin.